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PHILOSOPHY

Physicalism and Humanism
Robert Sheehan*
In recent years philosophers have been discussing the
pros and cons of the "Identity Hypothesis" of Herbert
Feig! (Feig!, 1958). The Identity Hypothesis holds that
feelings, expressed or described in phenomenalist language, are identical to brain states as described by rapidly
developing neural science. The discussions abound with
Ockham's Razor, attacks on and defenses of emergentism, and appeals to Turing Machines as analogues (Hook,
1960).
This paper does not propose to enter that particular
dispute, although the author believes the Identity theorists have made the better case thus far. Rather, it is
here proposed ,to widen the frame of reference surrounding such disputes. For, underlying the arguments, are
considerations as to the promise of physical science for
explaining our feelings, attitudes, language, acts, and behavior. An appraisal of such promise would seem to
demand that account be taken of sciences other than
neurophysiology which purport to explain our feelings,
language, and acts. The three sciences particularly concerned are psychology, sociology, and linguistics.
The Self Pragmatically Considered

All too often individual psychology and social psychology have pursued their own lines of investigation without
weighing the alternative explanations sufficiently. Individual psychology's left wing assumes that the individual
is free, given certain conditions, to change or alter considerably his basic pattern. "Self-actualization" has become a rallying cry for this very humanist trend, which
has many parallels with certain notions in existentialism.
The social psycholog,ist, on the other hand, stresses the
environmental factors determining one's fundamental life
pattern. The point here is not to take sides: freedom
against determinism, or conversely, but to ask whether
the language of either or both protagonists is irreducibly
macroscopic in reference.
,
Writers such as Eric Fromm (1956), Abraham Maslow ( 1962), Carl Rogers ( 1961), and Everett Shostrom
( 1967) use the term "person" and "self" in ways which
are emotionally significant as well as having some descriptive function. That is, their writing has a double purpose:
to convey understanding and to stimulate psychological
growth. The self, for the so-called "Third School of Psychology," is to be cherished and cared for; if it is loved,
it will provide entrance to constructive relations with
others. But if the self is construed as a set of processes in
the reticular activating system (Fair, 1963), then it ap-
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pears that the pragmatic function of the language underpinning therapy is in jeopardy. For there are few, it seems,
who would regard some redundant circuitry as worthy of
self esteem. Men can find their feelings enhanced by a
close awareness of ocean, of trees, of wind, of grass under
the sun, or perhaps by practicing yoga; but to a configuration of neurons the response is generally interest questioning perhaps - but not an enlargement of selfconsciousness.
This state of affairs may be temporary; it may be an
aesthetic lag. If so, it would be interesting to investigate
the conditions surrounding it. It has nothing to do with a
dualist view of man, for some of those who respond
strongly to nahiral beauty both feel and understand man
to be simply part of nature ( Gibran, 1966). It may be
the case that a negative response to physicalism, in either
the reductionist or broad sense, is after all due to a reluctance to give up any vestige of hope for immortality. So
long as man remains somewhat mysterious, so long as
there is always "something more" which science cannot
explain, thus far can one, even in secret, hope for the
Great Survival.
If the last speculation is somewhat implausible, the
following one is obvious. We gain our early notions about
ourselves especially from what is, phenomenally speaking,
outside ourselves; from others: their appearances, their
movements, their shapes, their smells, their sounds. Our
own bodies become part of the picture and a whole host
of images, gestalten if you will, is developed, to become
an integral part of our psychological life. These living
functions seem to some to be destroyed when analyzed.
"Seem" is emphasized here because there is a fallacy involved: that an explanans necessarily replaces its explanandum. I hope to show that micro explanations, in many
cases, are unable to replace their explananda, not only
from the pragmatic standpoint, but also from the theoretical one.
In spite of the imagined threats on the part of neurophysiology, the life of feeling goes on, around a dominant
theme, a fearful one, or a confident one, but a set of feelings which is partly responsible for the kind of personal
world we create. Clearly, from the standpoint of life in
the living, it contributes nothing to consider these feelings
as axonal firings with visceral reverberations.
Consider the example of face-to-face interaction with
other people. Smiles, frowns, sneers, soothing or irritating talk are the currency of such transactions. As such
they are meaningful units. A shrug of the shoulder or a
brush of the hand are analyzable into processes of the
efferent nervous system, together with the muscle and
skeletal systems. But it is not as so analyzed that they are
effective in social interactions; it is only as perceived phenomenally that they communicate. Inasmuch as the terms
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of social science and parts of psychology are concerned
with describing the conditions making such transactions
and relations possible, so much are they theoretically
irreducible to any in micro science.
Linguistics and Reductionism
Arising out of the intersection of our needs, ecological
and linguistic settings, human interactions and creativity,
the concept of culture is both problem and point of departure for the social sciences. Culture thus has parameters in biology, as Morris (I 968) and Lorenz (1966) attest. What must be remembered in such work is that,
while the remote history of culture is phylogenetic, its
recent past is shot through with symbol systems, both
linguistic and otherwise, which are, of course, diverse
throughout the world and in time (Manis and Meltzer,
1967). If, at some future time, a neurolinguistics develops; if we discover the physiological correlates of, say,
Chomsky's ( 1957) syntactic structures, even in this case
the symbol systems themselves, as artifacts, can be studied
in terms of their organization and functions.
Molecular and Organismic Biology
In defense of biology itself as irreducible to physics and
chemistry, Barry Commoner (1961) has offered a number of arguments. Commoner does not, of course, deplore
recent advances in molecular biology; what he does deplore is the separation, even alienation, of the newer,
more glamorous areas of research from the more classical
studies. The folrowing is one of his arguments:

Classical plant morphologists have produced
monumental works on starch grains, which
have unique structural organization closely correlated with the plant's specific character. In
more recent years an equally impressive body
of knowledge about the chemical substances
extractable from the starch grain-amylose and
amylopectin-has accumulated. Moreover enzymes that synthesize these substances have
been isolated. Yet an analysis of the information available from studies of extracts shows
that we do not understand how the enzymes
could possibly account for the presence together in the starch grain of both amylose and amylopectin in proportions which are under genetic
control. Clearly, our attention must now return
to the developing starch grain, and we must
learn how the cellular environment can give to
a precise correlation between the two paths of
biosynthesis that cannot be accounted for in
terms of test tube chemistry.
Cooperative efforts may or may not have been made
in this case, but the need for such continual cooperation
is manifest. That cooperation is often lacking is discussed
by Commoner ( 1961) in terms of a proces of alienation
which he sees setting in as soon as an important biological
problem becomes susceptible to chemical or physical
attack; in the end the question becomes lost to biology.
But the rub is, Commoner claims, that in each case the
chemical-physical researches run their course and come
to a dead stop in the regions surrounding the living cell.
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The return to biology is, by this time, a practical impossibility, not the least reason for which is the reluctance of
the mother to welcome back her prodigal, but fast-talking
offspring.
Commoner further contends that misunderstandings of
the popular DNA story have contributed to the widespread belief, represented in Asimov ( 1960), for example, that, "Modern science has all but wiped out the
borderline between life and non-life."
"I sometimes think," Commoner ( 1961) retorts, "that
the difficulties we now face in controlling water, air, and
soil pollution, and the undue dissemination of radioactive
materials, are the result of a common impression that,
'the boundary between life and non-life has all but disappeared'."
While it is quite true that pre-Wittgensteinian modes
of definition will simply not do for living systems, nevertheless a list of defining characteristics can be drawn up,
reflecting the quorum feature of language, which will
serve well enough. Borderline cases can be treated casually; rather than be disturbed by them, we should welcome
them, since evolutionary theory does, after all, demand
a continuum. In addition to a sophisticated view of definition, what is required is a theory of explanation which is
pluralistic, thus allowing the explanandum a life even
after it has been assigned an explanans.
For the sake of biology itself, to say nothing of social
sciences, psychology, and, not least, human living, it is
important to resist the tendency to think that, because
our macroscopic units are analyzable into the molecular,
such units are meaningless except as so considered. This
suggests no return to vitalism; for, if the history of science
has shown us anything, it is that vital processes are thoroughly physical. Nor is it to be urging that macro units
be everywhere preserved; rather, it is here suggested that,
insofar as macro units are given in explananda, insofar
as they pose problems and have a phenomenal existence,
thus far are they uneliminable. This is especially the case
where the data are human beings, as in the social sciences; here the explanations require a macroscopic domain of discourse. It also can be the case with the nonhuman, and even the non-living, especially seen with the
eyes of the artist, whose eyes we all ought to have even
though we do not have the artist's hands.
Aesthetics and Reductionism
The area of aesthetics is particularly enlightening in
discussions of reductionism. It is understandable why
physics and chemistry fail to excite the artist, for he sees
sub specie vitae. To be an aesthetic object is to be alive,
to be growing. Susanne Langer (f 967; 199-210) has put
it this way:

... if feeling is a culmination of vital process,
any articulated image of it must have the semblance of that vital process rising from deep,
general organic activities and intense and concerted acts, such as we perceive directly ... as
impacts or felt actions. Every artistic form reflects the dynamism that is constantly building
up the life of feeling.
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A painting or statue is not, at first thought, growing or
dynamic; Langer ( 1967) explains that in a work of art
no parts retain their qualitative identity in isolation from
other parts. They do not relate simply and directly to the
whole, but, " ... can only reflect each other, enhance or
otherwise modify each other." In art, of course, the medium is illusion.

In a Cambodian Buddha statue, for instance,
there is usually a perfect elaboration of the
head, and a flowing line to the hands, which are
given slightly less articulation; the torso and
crossed legs are very simply treated as large
surfaces and opposed curves. There is a gradient of development toward the head, culminating in the face, and a lesser one toward the
hands that leads up to their delicate form and
gesture. Such a figure has the living stillness of
a plant; its inward action is concentrated in its
apex, the head, which consequently predominates without being given any other emphasis
by way of extraordinary proportion, posture or
features.
The scientist must understand that the artist or humanist is frightened by reductionist views because what he
prizes most highly, his feelings, are seen by him as subject to elimination when explained scientifically. What is
clearly needed is a limiting principle on explanation.
There seems to me to be a viable public-private distinction, one which places no limits on scientific investigation, but which preserves the values of the intuitionist.
Explanation involves languages of public observation.
Once it is recognized that feelings-as-lived are as irreducibly private as explanations are irreducibly public,
then scientific explanations can be adequate without being
threatening to the humanist. There is no paradox in this
if a physicalism is accepted. Privacy does not entail a nonphysical mind; rather, a physical mind entails privacy.
Conscious experience is within one's own body: communicable, expressible, similar to the felt experiences of
others, nevertheless part of me. It is the distinctness of
bodies which is the ground for privacy; non-physical
minds have a way of becoming oversouls or cosmic consciousness. Consciousness is a phase of certain highly
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specific organic activity; it is not something different from
that activity, arising out of it or running parallel to it.
The author believes that a non-reductionist physicalism, as roughly sketched in this paper, has a positive relationship to humanism. If explanations are looked upon as
symbolic representations of what we experience or value:
of artistic or political activity, of joyful feelings, of accelerations of distant stars, then men can be threatened
by false explanations, but not by being signified in the
language of science.
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